Speaker
Description
Motivation and Research Question
The Farm to Fork Strategy aims to create a sustainable, fair, and resilient agri-food system. Achieving these objectives requires collective action, however cooperation is a social dilemma where individuals must balance personal gains against collective welfare. We study these mechanisms within a laboratory experiment focusing on students in agricultural sciences, as proxy for farmers. Specifically, the objective of this study is threefold: (i) we investigate participants' willingness to cooperate in four collective agricultural projects, covering environmental or social objectives; (ii) we assess whether trust and risk attitude do explain cooperation; (iii) focusing on the trust game, we explore whether knowing in advance the role will be reversed (i.e. playing both as sender and receiver) do affect the way the student plays the trust game.
Methods
To address our research questions we implement the linear Public Good Game (PGG) to assess cooperation in three projects with environmental focus (i.e. carbon farming, biogas plant and precision agriculture) and one with social focus (i.e. improvements in working conditions); trust is measured using the trust game, while risk attitudes are elicited through the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task. Statistical analysis will include non-parametric tests to compare cooperation levels across projects and regression models to examine the influence of trust and risk attitudes. The role reversal effect in the trust game is also analyzed through an information treatment where only a part of the participants is informed in advance about playing both roles.
Results and Lessons Learned
We expect cooperation levels to be higher for environmental sustainability projects than for the social project, aligning with trends observed in younger generations that emphasize environmental concerns. Trust is expected to be a significant determinant of cooperation, with higher trust levels linked to increased contributions in the PGG. Furthermore, risk aversion is likely to negatively impact cooperative behavior, leading to lower contributions. The role reversal condition in the trust game is hypothesized to induce greater self-reflection, potentially altering initial trust decisions.
Findings from this research will have direct implications for the design of agri-environmental policies. Understanding the interplay between trust, risk attitudes, and cooperation can inform the development of policy mechanisms that foster effective farmer collaboration. Additionally, insights into risk-related behaviors may guide the integration of risk management tools without discouraging cooperation.
| Keywords | cooperation, agri-environmental policies, public goods game |
|---|---|
| Status of your work | Experimental Design |
| Early Career Researcher Award | No, the paper is not eligible |
