Speaker
Description
Social norms have been identified as a strong predictor of behavior. In this experiment, we elicit social norms by adapting the Krupka & Weber (2013) design via an incentive-compatible coordination game. Respondents are presented with a scenario and potential actions related to agricultural practices in irrigation, pesticides and manure management. For each action, respondents are asked to guess how the majority of farmers would rate this behavior (i.e. socially appropriate or inappropriate according to a majority). In a between-subjects design, we frame the scenario as either an extreme or a normal year. Preliminary results from a sample of 182 farmers show that 49% of the respondents were able to match the shared social norm at least 8 times with an average of 8.3 (SD = 2.91). Results indicate that, when confronted with a scenario of extreme weather events, there is a statistically significant impact on farmers’ ranking of socially appropriate behaviors in 3 of the 15 statements (2 for water and 1 for pesticides). Further analysis will explore heterogeneity in the social norms regarding the appropriateness and whether they conform to the rule. In addition, regressions will be conducted to assess heterogeneity based on the socio-demographic characteristics.
| Keywords | farmers, injunctive social norms, extreme weather, coordination game |
|---|---|
| Status of your work | First results |
| Early Career Researcher Award | No, the paper is not eligible |
